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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, policymakers have urged experts to ana-
lyze comprehensively the nation's retirement programs and policies.'
Professor Michael Graetz's recent article, The Troubled Marriage of
Retirement Security and Tax Policies,2 is an effort in this direction. In
that article, Professor Graetz admirably seeks to address the three ma-
jor components of our retirement income system-Social Security, tax-
qualified private pensions, and individual savings-as a unified whole.
Unfortunately, he examines the retirement income system solely from
the perspective of tax policy. This limited focus leads him to find fault
with fundamental aspects of the system that are readily justified when a
broader, more comprehensive perspective is employed. In the name of
tax equity, he proposes solutions that would inadvertently undermine
important strengths of the current system of providing retirement in-
come. At the same time, he discounts or overlooks alternative solutions
t Lecturer in Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
A.B. 1971, Radcliffe College; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania. The author
thanks Ira C. Lupu and Robert J. Myers for their valuable comments on an earlier
version of this Response.
1 See, e.g., Ross, Private Sector Retirement Security: The Need for a Comprehen-
sive National Income Security Policy, in PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT AND U.S.
TAX POLICY 5 (1984) (observing that private pension plan issues are usually analyzed
solely from the perspective of federal tax policy and expressing the need for a more
comprehensive viewpoint, which includes public sector programs as well); see also Re-
tirement Income Security in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on So-
cial Security and the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1985) (statement by Rep. Bill Archer expressing
concern that Social Security and private pension legislation have been enacted in the
absence of a coordinated and consistent policy).
2 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1987) [hereinafter Graetz].
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that would alleviate his tax equity concerns in a manner more consis-
tent with broader income security goals.
Part I of this Response expands upon Professor Graetz's observa-
tion concerning the value of examining our retirement income system as
a unitary whole. Part II challenges his proposals to change the Social
Security payroll tax. It argues that in his quest for tax justice, Professor
Graetz ignores those attributes of Social Security that underpin its po-
litical support. This political support provides the program with the
long-term stability essential to the successful maintenance of any pro-
gram of retirement income. Part II concludes with a set of alternative
proposals that seek to reconcile his concerns with those essential attrib-
utes of Social Security. Finally, Part III discusses Professor Graetz's
objections to tax subsidies for the promotion of voluntary, employer-
sponsored private pensions. Part III then defends the use of tax ex-
penditures for that purpose.
I. THE VALUE OF COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSES OF THE NATION'S
RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEM
Retirement income in this country is generated from a variety of
public, private, and publicly-encouraged private sources. Our primary
public retirement program is the old-age and survivors portion of Social
Security.8 Most federal, state, and local employees participate in pen-
sion plans, financed mainly from public revenue.' The federal govern-
ment also provides retirement support to low-income people over age
sixty-five through a variety of means-tested programs,5 such as the
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program6 and the Food Stamp
program.
7
' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). For a
detailed description of Social Security, see R. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 3-708 (3d ed.
1985).
' Many public retirement programs require employee contributions as well. For a
discussion of federal, state, and local retirement plans, see R. MYERS, supra note 3, at
923-52. See also E. ANDREWS, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF PENSIONS 10-11, 33-39
(1985) (discussing government-employer pension plans, including the civil service re-
tirement system and state and local plans). In addition to these public programs, ap-
proximately 400,000 railroad employees are covered under a railroad retirement system
that is federally managed but financed by railroad employers and employees. For a
description of the railroad retirement system, see R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 769-819.
' A "means-tested" assistance program is one for which the payments are deter-
mined strictly on the basis of the recipient's means. The payment amounts are gener-
ally reduced to compensate for other income. See R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 713.
8 Supplemental Security Income for the Blind, Aged and Disabled ("SSI") is a
federally financed, means-tested program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (1982 & West
Supp. 1987); see generally R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 713-20.
" See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-29 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). In
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In addition to these public programs, the federal government em-
ploys tax subsidies to encourage private employers to provide retire-
ment income to their employees' and, to a more limited extent, to en-
courage individual savings.9 Other tax-favored vehicles, such as the
interest deduction for home mortgages, indirectly contribute to security
during retirement.10 Finally, in addition to the public programs and
tax-favored vehicles, some retirement income is generated from nontax-
qualified deferred compensation and from ordinary savings."
These various sources of retirement income and the rules and reg-
ulations governing them have developed incrementally. 2 More signifi-
cantly, these arrangements and the policies associated with them have
developed in a compartmentalized, fragmented manner. For example,
Congress has traditionally considered Social Security and private pen-
sion legislation in separate legislative vehicles, generally in different
years, and usually without reference to the impact of the changes on
1984, the Food Stamp program provided benefits to approximately 1.8 million people
over age 65. See SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING,
S. REP. No. 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1984). For a discussion of the various cash
and in-kind benefit programs providing support to low-income elderly, see EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RETIREMENT INCOME OPPORTUNITIES IN AN AGING
AMERICA: INCOME LEVELS AND ADEQUACY 20-24 (1982) [hereinafter EBRI]. See also
R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 711-68 (discussing the history, development, and current
status of public assistance programs including SSI, Medicaid, and Food Stamp).
8 See I.R.C. §§ 401-18 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985 & West Supp. 1987); see also
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLIC-
ITY 375 (1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS] (explaining that the ration-
ale for providing favorable tax treatment to qualified retirement plans provided by em-
ployers is that such plans "contribute to the national goal of providing security for all
retired workers"). For a discussion of what makes the tax treatment favorable, see
Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and
the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 433, 445-46 (1987).
' Preferential tax treatment is provided, in some circumstances, to individuals who
save for retirement through Individual Retirement Accounts or Keogh Plans (for self-
employed persons) and to employees who contribute to employer-sponsored retirement
plans. For a description and analysis of these provisions, see Graetz, supra note 2, at
895-902.
"0 The deduction of interest on home mortgages has permitted many people to
accumulate equity in their homes, increasing their overall wealth, and, if they remain
in their homes, reducing their expenses later in life. See EBRI, supra note 7, at 17-18.
For a general discussion of income tax incentives that indirectly contribute to retire-
ment security, see Graetz, supra note 2, at 902-04.
" For a discussion of the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred compensation, see
R. OSGOOD, THE LAW OF PENSIONS AND PROFIT-SHARING 307-46 (1984). For a
discussion of the role of individual savings for retirement, see Altman, supra note 8, at
502.
12 The system and its concomitant rules and regulations have developed gradually
over the entire history of this country, with most of the growth occurring during the
last fifty years. For a discussion of the history of public and private retirement plans in
the United States, together with the development of federal regulations, see W. GREEN-
OUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-77 (1976).
19881
1422 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
other parts of the retirement income system."3 Four separate congres-
sional subcommittees have jurisdiction over private pension legislation;
two other subcommittees have responsibility for Social Security. 4
Moreover, four different agencies of the federal government have ad-
ministrative responsibilities for major parts of the retirement income
system.' 5
The current concern about the lack of a coherent retirement in-
come policy can be explained not only by the incremental and frag-
mented manner in which policy has been made, but also by the fre-
quency of changes in recent years. Since 1974, private pension
legislation has been enacted in every year except 1977, 1979, and 1983.
In two of those latter years-1977 and 1983-major Social Security
amendments were enacted.' Moreover, much of the recent pension leg-
islation has been fueled by concerns collateral to the provision of old-
1" For a summary of the Social Security amendments from 1935 to the present,
see R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 209-68. For a summary, through 1984, of the primary
federal enactments regulating private pensions, see D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 15-55 (5th ed. 1984); E. PATTERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF
PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 85-113 (1960).
14 Jurisdiction over private pension legislation is divided in the House of Repre-
sentatives between the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Ways and Means Committee
and the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the Education and Labor
Committee and in the Senate between the Subcommittee on Private Retirement Plans
and Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Finance Committee and the Sub-
committee on Labor of the Labor and Human Resources Committee. Social Security
legislation is within the jurisdiction of the House Subcommittee on Social Security of
the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and
Family Policy of the Finance Committee. In addition, both the House Select Committee
on Aging and the Senate Special Committee on Aging are charged with studying the
problem of retirement income and making recommendations concerning Social Security
and pension plans. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., WASHINGTON INFORMA-
TION DIRECTORY 1987-1988, at 343-44 (1987) [hereinafter DIRECTORY].
16 The Social Security Administration within the Department of Health and
Human Services has primary responsibility for the administration of the Social Security
program, although the Secretaries of Treasury and Labor are on the Board of Trustees.
The Department of Treasury, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, a U.S. government corporation, each have partial jurisdiction
over the regulation of private pensions. In addition, many other agencies have jurisdic-
tion over aspects of the retirement system. For example, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, as a result of its jurisdiction over the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, regulates private pensions with respect to age discrimination. See id.
at 152, 162-63, 343.
1" Legislation with respect to private pensions has been enacted in 1975, 1976,
1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987. In 1987, Congress enacted the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330. For
a list of the enactments through 1986, see Altman, supra note 8, at 508 n.272. Major
changes to the old-age and survivors insurance portion of Social Security were enacted
in 1977, 1981, and 1983. See Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977); Pub. L. No.
97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981); Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
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age protection.17 These factors, together with the large federal cost of
these programs,"' have contributed to the calls for a comprehensive re-
assessment of the entire retirement income system.
Given our constitutional system of shared powers among different
branches and levels of government, it is understandable that the na-
tion's retirement income policies would have developed incrementally,
in a fragmented manner, and without explicit trade-offs among compet-
ing and often inconsistent goals. Moreover, incremental decisionmaking
has important strengths as a policymaking technique. It tends to re-
spond to real and specific problems. It implements comparatively mod-
est changes that can be tested and reversed if found to have unintended
negative consequences. It is flexible and adaptable to changing condi-
tions. At the same time, however, incremental decisionmaking, espe-
cially when it is fragmented, may lack coherence, or worse, produce
inconsistent results. As a consequence of these weaknesses, scholars who
seek to rationalize a set of broad policies and programs can provide
important insights for policymakers.19 Unfortunately, too many ana-
lysts in the retirement income field have limited their inquiries to nar-
row aspects of a particular retirement program without providing a
comprehensive framework within which to assess the system in general
and their own critiques in particular.20 As Professor Graetz points out,
this narrow focus on a particular program or policy has led to conclu-
17 For example, some of the enactments were responsive to budgetary concerns.
See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XXII,
95 Stat. 357, 830-42 (eliminating, among other things, student benefits and the mini-
mum benefit from the Social Security program). Other recent legislative changes were
driven by desires to provide incentives for capital accumulation or stock ownership by
workers. See, e.g., Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (provid-
ing a tax credit for Employee Stock Ownership Plans that satisfied certain conditions).
18 The favorable tax treatment accorded employer-sponsored retirement arrange-
ments constitutes the nation's largest tax expenditure. In 1986, the revenue loss was
estimated at approximately $78 billion. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX
ExPENDITURES: CURRENT ISSUES AND FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR Fis-
CAL YEARS 1984-88, at 47, app. A, table A-1 (1983). The old-age and survivors insur-
ance portion of Social Security is the largest domestic spending program. In 1985, it
paid benefits of over $165 billion. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1986
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No.
189, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986) [hereinafter TRUSTEES' REPORT].
9 For example, Senator Bill Bradley stated that Professor Stanley Surrey's
landmark book on tax expenditures was influential in the Senator's thinking about tax
reform. See A Sense of Where He Is, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 37 (referring to S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAx EXPENDITURES
(1973)).
20 See, e.g., Roberts, Social Security: Myths and Realities, 3 CATO J. 393, 400-01
(1983) (criticizing the impact taxing Social Security benefits has on other retirement
saving without discussing the tax-favored status of much of those other savings).
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sions that turn out to be unwarranted when the program or policy is
evaluated in a broader context.21
II. IN DEFENSE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAX
By focusing on the entire retirement income system, Professor
Graetz avoids the tunnel vision he criticizes. He restricts his own vi-
sion, however, by looking exclusively through the limiting filter of tax
policy. Consequently, he criticizes the regressivity of the Social Security
payroll tax and calls for its reform.22 Professor Graetz proposes ex-
empting low-income employees from its coverage, at least after they
make payments for a minimum number of quarters.23 In addition, he
urges the elimination of the maximum taxable wage base for tax pur-
poses but not for benefit purposes.2 Under this proposal, the highest-
income workers would be required to make FICA payments on their
entire salaries but would continue to receive the same benefits to which
they are entitled under current law.
2 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 852, 871-72 ("Complaints about the unfairness of
the social security pension system have become common.. . . [T]he core of the unfair-
ness claim is the failure of social security pensions to replicate . . . an 'actuarially fair'
insurance scheme. . . . Viewed from the perspective of overall retirement security, par-
ticularly when one considers how income tax expenditures . . . shape that policy, the
real fairness problems [are different]."). Some analysts have criticized Social Security
for its unfairness to young, higher income workers. See, e.g., Ferrara, The Prospect of
Real Reform, 3 CATO J. 609, 613 (1983) (arguing that the rate of return from Social
Security for many younger, higher-income workers will be "practically zero"). This
and other rate-of-return calculations are controversial. See, e.g., Myers & Schobel, A
Money's-Worth Analysis of Social Security Retirement Benefits, in TRANSACTIONS 533
(1983) (criticizing other analyses for making inconsistent assumptions, for ignoring cer-
tain benefit features, and for using incorrect methodologies). Nevertheless, even if a
particular calculation were considered correct, a criticism of the retirement income sys-
tem on the basis of the rate of return provided by Social Security to higher income
workers would be unwarranted in light of the large tax subsidies for private pensions
that disproportionately benefit those same workers claimed to be unfairly treated by
Social Security.
22 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 864-74. Social Security is financed through a tax
that is levied, under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), on wages or
earnings equal to or below a specified maximum taxable wage base ("covered wages")
and are assessed in equal amounts against employers and employees. See I.R.C.
§§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Therefore, the FICA tax is actually
proportionate up to the maximum taxable wage base. With respect to wages above and
below the wage base, the tax is regressive. It has been pointed out that because the tax
is only levied on earned income, it is slightly progressive at the lowest income levels,
where some income consists of tax-exempt transfer payments. Moreover, even without
the exemption of income above the taxable wage base, the tax might be considered
regressive at upper-income levels because higher-income individuals generally have a
larger percentage of nonwage income. See J. PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAUSSIG,
SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM 178-80 (1968) [hereinafter PECHMAN].
22 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 868, 906.
24 See id. at 869-71.
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If Social Security is viewed merely as a transfer program sup-
ported by federal taxes, indistinguishable from all other government
spending programs, Professor Graetz's argument is compelling. 5 From
a tax equity perspective, a regressive tax is unjustifiable if it fails to
take into account ability to pay.26 The narrow focus on tax justice,
however, overlooks a fundamental point: Social Security is a retirement
program. Retirement income programs are intended to provide not only
tangible cash benefits upon retirement, but also the intangible benefit of
security during a future beneficiary's working years. If the promise of
benefits is unfulfilled, retirees and those close to retirement age are in-
jured at a time in their lives when they are least able to adjust. Retire-
ment income generally accrues over one's entire work life. A person
cannot easily replace it a few years before it is needed. Some people
may be able to continue working but many may not, either because of
poor health or loss of employment. The only choices available may be
to rely on means-tested welfare or to move in with relatives. Either
circumstance subjects the individual to a devastating loss of indepen-
dence. Because of this acute vulnerability, people must be able to rely
on the long-term promises of retirement income programs if these pro-
grams are to accomplish the intended goal of providing security during
the working years.
A promise of retirement income made today but not payable for
more than forty years, however, is inherently insecure. This is true
whether a private actor or the government makes the promise, although
the nature of the insecurities differ. A private promise may fail because
the promisor may no longer be in existence. Alternatively, the promisor
may have insufficient funds to pay the obligation. If the funds are set
aside in advance, the obligation may still be unsatisfied as a conse-
quence of poor investment management or a misappropriation of the
25 For an interesting discussion of three alternative conceptual models of Social
Security-the tax-transfer model, the insurance model, and the annuity-welfare
model-and the different policy directions in which they lead, see Thompson, The So-
cial Security Reform Debate, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1425, 1436-38 (1983).
28 Professor Graetz, as well as others, have found fault with the tax in part be-
cause it is assessed on first dollars earned, without any exemptions or deductions to
reflect differing expenses of taxpayers. See Graetz, supra note 2, at 864-65; see also
PECHMAN, supra note 22, at 182. Some have defended the tax by pointing to the pro-
gressive benefit formula. See, e.g., R. MYERS, supra note 3, at 455 ("Critics of the
payroll taxes ... are quick to point out that they are regressive. . . . But when both
sides of the coin are considered-benefits and taxes-OASDI and HI are definitely not
regressive. Looking merely at the tax side is playing ostrich."). Professor Graetz dis-
misses this argument on a number of grounds. See Graetz, supra note 2, at 872-74
(arguing that the retirement income system as a whole has a far less redistributive
effect than Social Security alone, and that Social Security does not come close to replac-
ing the full income of low earners).
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set-aside funds. In contrast, the permanence of the national government
and its ability to levy taxes eliminates the insecurities of the private
promise. No Congress, however, can bind itself or its successors to
maintain statutory entitlements. As a consequence, a commitment of fu-
ture benefits made by the government is politically insecure.
For a public system of retirement income to accomplish its goals,
this inherent political insecurity must be addressed. If people are una-
ble to depend on the long-term continuation of Social Security, the pro-
gram ceases to function as intended; it provides retirement income only,
not retirement security. People, of course, depend on all government
spending programs to some extent. However, people depend on Social
Security in a manner different from their reliance on most other gov-
ernment programs, because they plan for retirement many years in ad-
vance, because retirement programs generally provide income for basic
support, and because older people often lack the flexibility to adjust to
losses of income.2 7 As a consequence, the government has an obligation
to attempt to ensure the long-term continuation of Social Security.
The original architects of the Social Security program ingeniously
responded to the need for long-run security by creating a self-financing
program through the use of an earmarked payroll tax, the proceeds of
which were to be held in trust funds segregated from the government's
general operating fund.28 These features set Social Security apart from
other government programs. Although Congress has the power to re-
duce or eliminate Social Security benefits29 and has on occasion done
so," the retention of the program's financial structure has reinforced
27 People's reliance on discretionary grants is clearly different, since no particular
applicant for a grant can be assured of receiving it. Although the distinctions are not as
striking when Social Security is compared to other entitlements, differences do exist.
For example, people may depend on guaranteed student loans. If the program were
repealed, however, individuals could still receive an education. They could enroll in less
expensive colleges, work part-time, or defer their educations for a few years while they
worked and saved. In contrast, if Social Security were repealed, many people could not
ever retire. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: To-
WARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 166 (1981) [hereinafter PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY].
2 See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401-33 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)). Over
the course of Social Security's history, there have been transfers of general revenue, but
generally only to finance the benefits of special, small closed groups in certain limited
situations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 428(g) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (providing appropri-
ations for reimbursement of the Social Security trust funds with respect to benefits paid
to people otherwise uninsured who attained age 72 before 1968).
2 The promise of Social Security benefits is not a binding contractual right. See,
e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960) (upholding the termination of
the Social Security benefits of an alien deported for having been a member of the Com-
munist party).
30 Benefits were curtailed as early as 1939 and as recently as 1983. See Social
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the perception that Social Security is different from other federal pro-
grams. Moreover, policymakers have bolstered and protected the per-
ceived special status of Social Security in other ways. For example, in
1983, at the same time that Congress reduced Social Security benefits,
it removed the program from the unified budget. 1 Removing Social
Security from the unified budget is largely a symbolic change. Never-
theless, it sets the program apart and underscores the policymakers' de-
termination to keep the program secure for future retirees.
A. The Conceptual Basis of Social Security
Some analysts believe that the earmarked tax, its designation as a
"contribution" rather than a tax, and other attributes designed to signal
Social Security's special status, are cynical and undemocratic attempts
by its supporters to conceal the program's "true" nature. 2 It is not
these relatively superficial features, however, that cause Social Security
to be politically stable. Rather, these features illuminate and dramatize
the program's underlying conceptual core. Social Security is popular
and, therefore, secure, because it is social insurance, not welfare. Pro-
fessor Graetz's proposals would inadvertently weaken the long-run sta-
bility of Social Security by transforming it from a social insurance pro-
gram to a welfare program.
The distinction between social insurance and welfare is significant.
The concepts are derived from separate historical traditions and have
Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (eliminating a lump-sum pay-
ment at death that approximated the excess, if any, of employee contributions paid,
plus an allowance for interest, over benefits received); Social Security Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 415 (Supp.
III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (Supp. III 1985)) (delaying the cost of
living adjustment for six months and gradually raising the age from 65 to 67 at which
full benefits are paid).
31 Removing Social Security from the unified budget simply requires that its ex-
penditures and revenues be reflected separately from the rest of the federal budget and
not be included in the overall budget balance. The removal was to be effective starting
in 1992. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 911(a) (Supp. III 1985)). However, in 1985, Congress made
the removal effective in 1986 but included the program in budget calculations for pur-
poses of meeting the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets. See Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. 2, 99 Stat. 1038
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 911 (Supp. III 1985)). For a discussion of the history and
issues concerning the interrelationship of Social Security and the unified budget, see R.
MYERs, supra note 3, at 370-72.
32 See, e.g., M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 224-27 (1979)
(reporting comments of critics in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s); see also P. FERRARA,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 16 (1980) ("[F]alse impressions
and beliefs have been created by the . . . blatant misrepresentations of social security
by politicians and government officials over the years.").
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resulted in programs containing sharply divergent features.33 During
the Middle Ages, workers in guilds contributed portions of their wages
to protect themselves and their families in the event of lost earnings due
to death or disability. These and subsequent contributory worker pro-
grams developed as a consequence of insecurities against which workers
could not individually protect themselves. The programs involved the
concerted activities of the entire community. Government programs of
social insurance evolved from these self-help worker programs.34 Con-
sistent with its origins, Social Security requires that all workers con-
tribute some wage-related amount for their benefits and that the longer
workers are employed and the higher their covered earnings, 5 the
greater their cash benefits.36 Because benefits are tied to previous living
standards, Social Security encourages work. 7 Assets are irrelevant to
benefit determinations, so savings are encouraged. Finally, because re-
tirees need only show that they have worked the requisite number of
quarters to qualify for benefits,38 Social Security maintains the dignity
of recipients.
In contrast to social insurance, welfare is grounded exclusively in
the concept of need. Its historical roots lie in private charitable efforts,
which later developed into government programs of assistance to the
poor.3" These programs have frequently contained oppressive and puni-
tive features.4 Consistent with this historical tradition, eligibility for
" For a similar discussion of the distinctions, see R. Ball, The Original Under-
standing of Social Security: Implications for the Future 2-4 (paper delivered at the Yale
Social Security-Medicare Symposium) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review) (forthcoming in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS
(T. Marmor, J. Mashaw, eds. 1988)). See also Munnell, The Current Status of Our
Social Welfare System, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1987, at 3, 5-8 (describing
the history and differences between social insurance and welfare and comparing the
provisions of Social Security, SSI, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
3 See Ball, supra note 33, at 2.
3 For a definition of covered wages or earnings, see supra note 22. Because the
five lowest years of earnings are disregarded in calculating benefits, two workers could
have different earnings in those five years and nevertheless have identical benefits.
36 The Hospital Insurance portion of Social Security (i.e., Part A of Medicare) is
available to, among others, all people over age 65 who are eligible for the cash benefits
under Social Security. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
1987). Despite higher contributions by some, all beneficiaries are entitled to the same
benefit package.
I See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (the
primary insurance amount is based upon the worker's average indexed monthly
earnings).
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 414 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (requiring a showing of number
of quarters of coverage to qualify for benefits).
11 See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE 9-11 (1971).
" See id. at 32-38 (discussing the degradation of those on relief).
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the nation's welfare programs is conditioned on satisfying strict means
tests that measure current income and asset levels of potential recipi-
ents. Benefits bear no relationship to previous standards of living;
rather, benefits are designed merely to satisfy a standardized, commu-
nity-determined, minimal level of need. Neither eligibility nor benefit
amounts are in any way contingent on prior taxes paid or prior earn-
ings. Because welfare programs provide flat grants and because earn-
ings are offset in whole or in part from payments,41 welfare discourages
work. Moreover, because welfare is based on need, families cannot
qualify unless they have virtually no assets. The result is that welfare
discourages saving. Finally, welfare is inherently demeaning because
applicants must demonstrate that they are incapable of providing for
themselves.
Two basic principles of program design, then, are fundamental to
the difference between Social Security and welfare. First, Social Secur-
ity eligibility depends on wage-related contributions. Welfare eligibil-
ity, in contrast, is based exclusively on need. Second, Social Security
benefit levels vary with earnings and length of work. Higher past earn-
ings and more years of work result in higher cash benefits. These fac-
tors are irrelevant to the determination of welfare benefits. Rather, the
level of welfare benefits depends on need. Higher current earnings re-
sult in lower benefit amounts.
Some analysts blur the distinction between social insurance and
welfare by characterizing the redistributive features of Social Security
as welfare.42 Redistribution alone, however, does not determine
whether a benefit is insurance or welfare. All insurance is in some
sense redistributive. If, for example, one purchases health insurance,
and the next day becomes seriously ill, the insured receives benefits of
much greater value than the amount of the premium paid. Those in-
sured individuals who remain healthy and receive no benefits have, in
effect, redistributed their premium amounts to the now ill beneficiary.
Some argue that the analogy between the redistributive features of
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985 & West Supp. 1987)
(requiring that states participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program develop a standard of need that takes into account certain earnings and asset
levels of potential recipients).
"I See, e.g., C. WEAVER, THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC AND PO-
LITICAL ORIGINS 187-89 (1982) (arguing that the redistributive effects of intergenera-
tional and intragenerational transfers are unfair); Parsons & Munro, Intergenerational
Transfers in Social Security, in THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 65, 66 (M. Boskin ed. 1978) (describing the so-called welfare components
of Social Security). See generally Thompson, supra note 25, at 1437-38 (describing the
view of those who conceptualize Social Security as partially insurance and partially
welfare).
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Social Security and private insurance is misleading. Those who make
this claim assert that the benefits must be viewed prospectively. When
so viewed, private insurance benefits are actuarially related to premi-
ums.43 This quality, however, describes Social Security, as well. From
an individual participant's perspective, Social Security, like private in-
surance, is only redistributive when examined ex post facto. When
workers join the work force, they do not know, for example, whether
they will suffer disability, unemployment, or premature death. They
cannot foresee whether they will have dependents at the time of an
insurable event. Depending on these and other circumstances, particu-
lar individuals may receive benefits that are larger or smaller than con-
tributions paid.
Social Security benefits and contributions, moreover, are actuari-
ally based. The Social Security Administration employs a large staff of
actuaries who produce annual reports detailing the actuarial status of
the various funds." Although benefit levels include intragenerational
and intergenerational subsidies, and therefore benefits and contribu-
tions are not actuarially equivalent, many private insurance plans lack
equivalence as well. Indeed, most private group health insurance and
defined benefit pension plans contain a variety of cross-subsidizations.45
Social insurance is labeled "social" because, unlike private insurance, it
insures against certain social conditions, such as low wage levels and
large numbers of dependents. Protection against these risks, however,
does not transform what is otherwise insurance into welfare.
One feature of Social Security that seems especially welfare-like is
that beneficiaries with lower average covered earnings receive a greater
benefit as a proportion of those earnings than beneficiaries with higher
average covered earnings.46 Although this aspect of the program causes
"' See, e.g., Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1445 (1986) ("[Insurers] insist that the proper way to look at [insurance] is
prospectively-at the time terms are agreed to and the actual pattern of losses is known
only probabilistically. . . . In the paradigmatic, or 'actuarially fair,' insurance contract,
there is no redistribution because the present value of each insured's premium pay-
ments equals the present value of the insurer's liability.").
4' See supra note 18.
For example, the use of gender-specific mortality tables in calculating retire-
ment benefits under employer-sponsored pension plans has been held to be unlawful.
See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1077 (1983) As a conse-
quence of the shorter life expectancies of men, unisex mortality tables cause men to
subsidize women in the provision of life annuities and women to subsidize men in the
provision of survivor benefits.
46 Those with low average covered earnings will tend to be low-income workers.
In addition to low-income workers, though, intermittent workers and workers who have
worked most of their careers in noncovered service also receive proportionately higher
benefits because the Social Security benefit formula uses indexed earnings averaged
over a specified number of years (ultimately 35), and years without covered earnings
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redistribution from higher-income workers to lower-income workers, it
is, nevertheless, reconcilable with insurance principles.4 Indeed, the
feature is in striking contrast to the attributes of welfare described
above.
Although lower-income workers receive higher proportionate ben-
efits under Social Security, the benefit structure ensures that those with
higher covered earnings receive higher dollar amounts in absolute
terms. This outcome is the consequence of a progressive benefit
formula, similar in concept to the progressive rates of the federal in-
come tax system.4 ' The formula divides earnings into three brackets. As
in the income tax system, each bracket has a percentage rate associated
with it. The first dollars of earnings are replaced at the highest per-
centage rate, the next level of bracketed earnings at a lower rate, and
the highest earnings at the lowest rate. Workers with the very lowest
levels of earnings have all their earnings contained within the first
bracket and consequently replaced at the highest percentage rate.
The disproportionately large benefits received by low-income
workers are properly perceived not as welfare, but as basic benefits that
every beneficiary receives. The Social Security benefit of every benefi-
ciary consists of a portion that is based on those earnings that are
are included in the average as zero years. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1982 & Supp. III 1985
& West Supp. 1987).
47 Another feature of Social Security that involves substantial redistribution is the
benefit provided to dependent spouses. This aspect of the program has been criticized in
recent years for its apparent unfairness to working women. As a consequence of the
availability of a generous benefit for dependent spouses of workers, families consisting
of workers with spouses employed at low wages may receive no higher cash benefits
than families with one wage worker and a nonwage-earning spouse. (It should be noted
that the wage-earning spouse does receive disability and survivor benefit protection,
which the nonwage-earning spouse does not.) See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
EARNINGS SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 12-13 (1986). The
spousal benefit arguably is controversial because it violates one of the two core princi-
ples outlined in the text. Wage-earning spouses who receive only the amount of the
dependent spouse's benefit, but no additional benefit based on their own earnings, fail
to receive more as a result of their work efforts. Nevertheless, this provision is actually
consistent with the basic principles of Social Security. The criticisms should instead be
viewed as a product of the change in the status of women in the last 50 years. In the
1930s, wives arguably were not seen as separate from their husbands. Moreover,
women did not enjoy legal protection against gender discrimination in employment. In
such a society, it made sense for male workers to insure against the risk of a dependent
spouse. Today, however, many women work and are insured in their own right under
Social Security. The program has not adjusted to the current status of working women,
and instead provides those women (and those men who earn less than half of what their
wives earn) with overlapping protection, both as workers and as dependent spouses.
This is an aspect of the program that should be corrected.
4" For a detailed description of the way in which benefits are calculated, see R.
MYERS, supra note 3, at 49-89, 147-68. See also Altman, supra note 8, at 476-78
(discussing the progressive nature of Social Security).
19881
1432 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
within the first bracket of the formula. Higher-income workers receive
lower rates of return because their benefits are based in part on earn-
ings that fall within the remaining two brackets. These workers, in
effect, contribute towards and are entitled to supplemental bene-
fits-those additional dollars that result in a larger benefit in absolute
terms.
Neither private insurance nor any of the nation's means-tested
welfare programs contains the kind of benefit formula found in Social
Security. Rather, the formula is an appropriate feature of social insur-
ance. No workers-not even highly-trained professionals-know at the
beginning of their working years whether they will have low career
earnings. Low career averages can result not only from low-wage jobs,
but also from a variety of uncontrollable occurrences such as illnesses,
disabling accidents, premature death, or periods of unemployment.
Consequently, Social Security properly protects all workers against
those eventualities.
B. A Critique of Professor Graetz's Proposals in Light of Social
Security's Conceptual Core
This nation would certainly be more humane if it accorded equal
value to programs developed around the contrasting principles of social
insurance and welfare. The nation, however, seems to prefer the values
of work, self-help, and saving, embodied in the tradition of social insur-
ance, to the values of charity and compassion embodied in welfare."9 As
a result, proposals to change Social Security should be evaluated in
terms of their effect on the program's social insurance values. These
values keep Social Security politically popular and, consequently, give
it the stability essential for current workers to be able to rely on its
continuation.
In the name of tax justice, Professor Graetz's proposals would in-
advertently introduce elements of welfare into the design of Social Se-
curity. Professor Graetz proposes that low-income workers be exempted
"' Professor William Simon describes a choice that was available in the 1930s to
structure Social Security around the concept of need, rather than around the private
law concepts of contract and insurance. Professor Simon acknowledges that the choice
was resolved by President Roosevelt on political grounds, but he seems to believe that
the choice to condition Social Security on need could have resulted in a Social Security
program as politically stable as the current one. See Simon, supra note 43, at 1431-33,
1448-54. Of course, no one can know today what the effect would have been if a differ-
ent choice had been made. Nevertheless, today, programs developed around the concept
of insurance are more politically stable than programs developed exclusively around the
concept of need; the former are less likely to be reduced in times of fiscal constraints.
See id. at 1465-66.
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from the Social Security payroll tax.5" These workers presumably
would be eligible for some minimum benefit amount even though, as a
consequence of the exemption, they would pay no payroll tax.51 As an
alternative, Professor Graetz would have these workers pay taxes for
some minimal number of quarters in order to qualify for bdnefits.52
Both proposals sever the important connection between length of work
and amount of earnings on the one hand, and level of benefits on the
other hand."
If a complete exemption from the payroll tax became law, low-
income workers would be perceived as getting Social Security benefits
for free. In that case, it would be difficult to justify differentiating be-
tween those receiving the lowest Social Security benefit and those quali-
fying only for means-tested SSI benefits. Workers covered under Social
Security would have a slightly greater attachment to the work force, but
if they were making no contributions to Social Security, this greater
connection to the work force would hardly seem to justify their qualifi-
cation for a separate and more generous income support program. 5 If
the two programs were combined, as would then seem warranted, asset
tests and other restrictions might be introduced to promote equitable
treatment among recipients and to prevent abuses, such as the receipt of
the low-income benefit by undeserving wealthier individuals who did
not otherwise qualify for Social Security. Whether or not the programs
were combined or restrictive tests were added, people would generally
10 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 864-68 (arguing that the payroll tax is an unfair
burden on low-income workers).
5 See id. at 906-07. Although Professor Graetz does not make clear whether he
would alter the benefit formula of Social Security in conjunction with the introduction
of an exemption for low-income workers, he presumably would introduce a minimum
benefit for all workers falling within the exempt amount. Otherwise, some would re-
ceive larger benefits simply because of higher wage levels, even though they would not
have contributed more dollars to the program.
52 See id. at 864-68.
11 In addition to the conceptual shortcomings, significant technical problems with
these proposals exist. For example, an exempt amount would require reconciliation for
workers who were employed part-time for several employers or who changed jobs in
the middle of the year. In addition, some employees would pay no taxes some years,
and some taxes other years. A benefit formula that was fair to these workers would
have to be developed. With respect to disability insurance, part of the vesting require-
ment demands recent attachment to the work force. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). As a consequence, unless this provision were eliminated, these workers
would lose their disability protection shortly after ceasing to contribute.
" Under current law, individuals over age 65 who have not had a substantial
attachment to the work force may qualify for SSI in place of or in addition to Social
Security. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (1982
& Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). Social Security currently employs no asset
tests. Moreover, depending on the level of the minimum benefit, Social Security might
also provide higher benefits.
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recognize that for those receiving the lowest benefit, the earned-right
quality of the program had disappeared.
Similar problems exist under Professor Graetz's alternative propo-
sal requiring a minimal payment from low-income workers. This alter-
native proposal satisfies one core principle of Social Security-that a
worker must contribute in order to qualify for benefits-but it violates
the principle that one's benefits will be higher with more years of work.
The current benefit structure provides larger benefits in absolute terms
not only for workers with higher earnings, but also for workers with
more years of coverage." Professor Graetz's proposal would limit all
low-income workers to a predetermined minimum, despite the greater
work effort of some. Again the linkage to work, a fundamental value
underlying Social Security, would be lost."
Professor Graetz's proposal to subject earnings above the taxable
wage base to the payroll tax, while holding the level of benefits con-
stant, suffers from the same kinds of problems as his proposal to ex-
empt low-income workers. As described above, benefits currently are
based on the earnings on which the payroll tax is assessed. In that way,
those who have higher covered earnings receive higher benefits in abso-
lute terms. If workers with higher covered earnings were receiving the
same benefit amounts as workers with lower earnings, the important
connection between earnings and benefits again would be severed.5
" The Social Security benefit formula is based on workers' average indexed
monthly earnings over their careers. The number of years used is the number of years
between 1950 or attainment of age 21, whichever is later, and attainment of age 62,
minus five years. Because wages are indexed to the growth of wages in the overall
economy, and because the highest earning years are used in computiig the average, the
longer one works, generally, the higher one's monthly average and corresponding bene-
fit will be. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
56 Congress included a minimum benefit in the 1935 statute primarily for admin-
istrative reasons. In 1977, Congress froze the initial amount and in 1981, eliminated
the benefit for almost all those first becoming eligible after 1981. A special minimum
benefit is available for those with very low earnings but a substantial number of years
of covered employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C)(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 &
West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of both of these benefits, see R. MYERS, supra note
3, at 78-84.
57 Proposals have been made to eliminate the taxable wage base without changing
the benefit formula. In that case, those individuals with earnings in excess of the cur-
rent base would receive higher benefits. These proposals, however, have been contro-
versial in part because, due to the higher benefits, they would not result in substantial
long-term savings. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 45
(Comm. Print 1981) ("large benefit levels and long-range benefit costs . . . substan-
tially offset the additional revenue").
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C. Alternative Solutions to Professor Graetz's Concerns
Retaining the two fundamental design features of Social Security
identified above is important to the stability of the program. At the
same time, concerns about the retirement income system should not
override other equally important policy goals, including those articu-
lated by Professor Graetz. His tax equity concerns, however, can be
satisfied in a manner more consistent with the requirements of the So-
cial Security program.
Professor Graetz is properly concerned about the burden that the
payroll tax imposes on the working poor. Partly in response to this
burden, Congress in 1975 enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit
("EITC").58 The EITC gives eligible low-income workers a tax credit
to be applied against their income taxes. The credit is refundable so
that workers with no tax liability can nevertheless receive its benefit.
Professor Graetz mentions the BITC in passing, but dismisses it as
inferior to his proposed solution of exempting low-income workers from
the coverage of the payroll tax.59 If the appropriate policy concern to be
addressed is the unfairness of the payroll tax, Professor Graetz's con-
clusion is correct, but tautological. His focus on the payroll tax alone,
however, is too narrow.
Just as all our retirement programs should be evaluated as one
comprehensive system, so too the overall burdens on the working poor
should be addressed comprehensively, not piecemeal. In addition to the
payroll tax, the working poor have at times been burdened by the in-
come tax.60 To the extent that employer taxes are borne by workers,6"
employer payments for unemployment compensation and for workers'
compensation further burden low-income workers. The cumulative tax
burden on the working poor is inconsistent with notions of ability to
pay. Moreover, work expenses create an additional hardship for low-
income employees. The taxes and work expenses create significant
work disincentives for the poor. These costs of working inadvertently
"0 See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 43, 89 Stat. 26, 30
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)).
Since this enactment, Congress has increased the size of the credit and the income level
at which it phases out, partly in response to increases in the Social Security payroll tax.
See JOINT COMMISSION ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX RE-
FORM AcT OF 1986, at 27 (1987).
'9 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 866 (calling the EITC "an inadequate substitute
for a minimum income level for exemption from the social security tax burden").
'0 Six million low-income families who had been subject to the federal income tax
were removed from the rolls by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See id. at 865.
6I See id. at 867 ("Economists generally agree that both the employers' and the
employees' shares of social security taxes are borne by employees in the form of reduced
wages.").
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increase the comparative attractiveness of welfare. More fundamentally,
the costs undercut the good-faith effort of those who are struggling to
escape poverty.
When the policy goal is more appropriately defined either as en-
couraging the work effort of the poor, or, more narrowly, as alleviating
the tax burden of the poor, the strength of the EITC and the weakness
of an exemption from the payroll tax becomes clear.62 A payroll tax
exemption, by definition, is limited to the amount of the payroll tax. In
contrast, the EITC can be increased to take into account other taxes
and expenses of the working poor. The EITC historically has been
larger for low-income workers than the cost of the employee FICA con-
tribution. 3 Moreover, the EITC is fairer to family units. Under a pay-
roll tax exemption, two-earner families would receive double exemp-
tions even though the family income might be the same as a single-
earner family. The EITC provides the identical relief to each taxpay-
ing unit with identical income.
Furthermore, a large number of low-income workers are members
of families which are not poor.64 The payroll tax exemption would give
these families unwarranted benefits. In contrast, the EITC better
targets benefits to low-income workers who are part of poor families.6 5
Moreover, the degree to which taxes and work expenses are burden-
some depends upon the number of people supported by a worker's
wages. Although the EITC currently does not take family size into ac-
count, it could be so modified.6 6 This modification would be adminis-
62 In addition to an exemption from the payroll tax or a tax credit, the govern-
ment could alleviate some of the burden on the working poor through a variety of other
methods including wage supplements, a guaranteed minimum income, a negative in-
come tax, or an increase in the minimum wage. For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of a negative income tax and a wage subsidy program, see M. BARTH,
G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM:
PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS AND CHOICES 52-58, 72-78 (1974). For a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of increasing the minimum wage, see Reischauer, Wel-
fare Reform and the Working Poor, in WORK AND WELFARE: THE CASE FOR NEW
DIRECTIONS IN NATIONAL POLICY 35, 41-42 (1987).
63 The level of the EITC has tended to be at about the level of the combined
employer-employee tax rate. For example, the EITC is currently 14% of the first
$5,714 (adjusted for inflation) of an eligible person's earned income. The credit phases
out between the income levels of $9,000 and $17,000. See I.R.C. § 32 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). The FICA rate for 1988 is 7.51% on employees and
employers each for a combined rate of 15.02%. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
See M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, supra note 62, at 73.
65 The EITC has targeting problems of its own. Because the credit is refundable,
those with little or no tax liability as a result of tax-sheltered income receive a windfall.
See Graetz, supra note 2, at 866 n.52 (quoting Steuerle & Wilson, The Taxation of
Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695, 702-03 (1987)).
66 This modification has been forcefully advocated and may yet become law. See,
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tratively simpler than including a comparable feature in the proposed
payroll tax exemption. Finally, the EITC also provides a more refined
work incentive. It phases out as income increases. Consequently, the
marginal rates facing low-income workers are moderated. An exemp-
tion from the payroll tax would impose a much higher marginal rate on
the first dollar earned above the exempt amount.
As Professor Graetz notes, the EITC has weaknesses.67 Currently,
only families with children can claim it. Further, Professor Graetz
speculates that the credit is probably not claimed by all those eligible to
receive it."8 These defects are serious but correctable, at least in part.
Eligibility for the credit should be expanded to include single workers
and childless couples in order to benefit all low-income workers. Mea-
sures should be taken to ensure its usage by those eligible to claim it. 9
If these changes are made, the EITC will be even more effective in
assisting the working poor and will do so without undermining Social
Security, a program that has protected millions of people from an im-
poverished old age.70
Professor Graetz's concern about the regressivity of the payroll tax
with respect to the highest-income taxpayers is also important.7 1 Here
again, though, the problem should be addressed comprehensively with-
out undercutting the political acceptability of Social Security. If the is-
sue is whether federal taxes are progressive when viewed in a unitary
manner, the federal tax burden should be analyzed comprehensively, as
Professor Graetz seeks to do. When viewed this way, it becomes clear
that a number of alternatives are available to satisfy Professor Graetz's
concerns.
e.g., Reischauer, supra note 62, at 42.
17 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 866-67.
6 See id. Under current law, employers are required to take the credit into ac-
count for withholding purposes; they must be presented, however, with a certificate by
the eligible employee. Moreover, if the credit owed employees is greater than the
amounts of taxes required to be withheld and paid the government, the employer may
either pay only a portion of the credit owed employees or treat the excess payments as
advance tax payments. If the employer does not pay the full amount of the credit
through the reverse withholding mechanism, employees who otherwise might not have
to file income tax returns would have to file in order to receive the full amount of the
credit. See I.R.C. § 3507 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
89 Congress should provide the Internal Revenue Service with increased resources
to discover those eligible for the credit and to assist them in obtaining the necessary
certificate. In addition, those employers who have credits in excess of withholding
should be required to pay the credit, but at the same time be permitted to claim an
immediate refund that should be provided on an expedited basis. Congress might con-
sider providing some form of special relief for any administrative costs incurred, espe-
cially by small employers, in providing the credit.
70 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 27, at 166.
71 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 864-65, 868-69.
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Although altering the incidence of the payroll tax is one approach,
a different solution, contained in the Internal Revenue Code, is at least
partly in place. In 1983, Congress provided that up to one-half of the
Social Security benefits of high-income taxpayers would be included in
their taxable incomes.7 2 Although subjecting Social Security benefits to
the federal income tax does not respond to Professor Graetz's concern
directly, it does so indirectly. Professor Graetz would require the high-
est-income workers to pay more taxes in order to qualify for the same
level of benefits as those who pay lower amounts.7" Under an appropri-
ately progressive income tax system, the inclusion of Social Security
benefits in taxable income would result in higher-income workers mak-
ing the same levels of contributions as lower-income workers, but re-
ceiving lower benefits when viewed on an after-tax basis.
For the taxation of Social Security benefits to satisfactorily address
the equity concerns of Professor Graetz, the federal income tax system
would have to be made more progressive in light of the lack of progres-
sivity of the payroll tax and other federal taxes.74 Rather than altering
the payroll tax, perceived inequities in the overall federal tax burden
should be corrected through the federal income tax system. It is the
nation's largest federal revenue source. Its central mission is the raising
of revenue. As a result of its size and mission, it is well equipped to
temper distributional problems in the payroll tax. Making the federal
income tax more progressive, in addition to subjecting at least a portion
of the Social Securiiy benefits to that tax, substantially solves Professor
Graetz's tax justice concerns. Significantly, it does so while leaving in-
tact the fundamental structure of Social Security so important to its
72 See I.R.C. § 86 (Supp. III 1985). In order to parallel the treatment of the
taxation of private pensions and avoid double taxation, a maximum of one-half the
benefit is taxed. The one-half is deemed to represent the employer's portion on which a
deduction is claimed at the time of contribution. The employer and employee contribu-
tions with imputed interest historically, however, have not represented more than 20%
of the benefit received. Therefore, it might be appropriate to tax the full benefit, after
the amount paid has exceeded taxes paid ,by the worker, which should result in a
greater portion of the benefit being taxed. See Ball, Insuring Our Future: The Financ-
ing of Social Security and Medicare, NAT'L VOTER, March-April 1986, at 6, 13. Pro-
fessor Graetz mentions the 1983 amendment, but does not discuss it in the context of
the maximum taxable wage-base. See Graetz, supra note 2, at 860.
" See Graetz, supra note 2, at 870-72.
74 Unfortunately, the motivation behind the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to sim-
plify the rate structure rather than to increase the overall progressivity of the tax sys-
tem. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 288-89 (1987)
(The authors document the political struggles that gave birth to the 1986 Tax Act:
"[Rieform narrowed the enormous inequities that permeated the existing tax system.
Although it made no fundamental changes in the distribution of the tax burden among
income groups, it did make it more likely that individuals and corporations with similar
incomes would pay similar taxes. In that way, it made the tax system more fair.").
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long-term acceptability.
III. IN DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSIONS
AND THE CONCOMITANT TAX SUBSIDY
In addition to criticizing the Social Security payroll tax, Professor
Graetz finds fault with the other major tax element of our retirement
income system, the tax expenditure for employer-sponsored pensions.
He points out that both the private pensions themselves and the tax
savings associated with them disproportionately benefit high-income
workers.7 5 Professor Graetz hints that his preferred retirement income
system would include mandatory employer-sponsored pension plans,
but he dismisses the idea as politically unrealistic. Instead, he proposes
imposing either a flat income tax on the investment earnings of pension
funds or, alternatively, an excise tax on the total assets of these funds. 6
He would then use the proceeds to raise Social Security benefit levels
for low- and moderate-income workers and to modify the payroll tax.77
While Professor Graetz's criticisms are sound, his conclusion, that the
role of voluntary private pensions should be diminished or eliminated,
is unwarranted. Moreover, his narrow focus on tax equity causes him
to ignore the adverse effects his proposal might have on the stability of
Social Security.
Professor Graetz correctly notes that the reliance on voluntary pri-
vate pensions as part of our national retirement income system is prob-
lematic. 8 First, not all employers will establish plans, even in the face
of favorable tax treatment. 9 Second, the reliance on voluntary plans
requires, but is in tension with, extensive and complicated regulations.
While some of the reasons employers establish private pensions are
consistent with a national retirement policy, some are different from or
may even be inconsistent with broader policy. For example, in the ab-
e See Graetz, supra note 2, at 874-94, 906-08. "The revenue loss attributable to
private pensions has been estimated to benefit high-income workers disproportionately,
and the distribution of benefits from private pension plans is skewed in the same direc-
tion." Id. at 876.
71 Id. at 908. Trust funds that are part of tax-qualified employer-sponsored pen-
sion, stock bonus, and profit-sharing plans are tax exempt. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a),
501(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
7 See Graetz, supra note 2 at 871-72.
78 See id. at 878 ("To use conditional tax incentives as a principal mechanism for
regulation poses an immediate dilemma because of the voluntary nature of employer-
provided pension plans. On the one hand, the creation of pension regulations always
reflects a concern that making qualification too difficult will inhibit the establishment
of pension plans. On the other hand, there is little public gain in subsidizing employee
plans that provide minimal or no benefits to low- and moderate-income workers.")
71 See E. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 12-16.
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sence of regulations, employers are likely to be concerned primarily
with structuring their plans to discourage resignations by those employ-
ees whom they perceive to be indispensable and to reward those whom
they perceive to be loyal. Moreover, younger workers may not appreci-
ate the value of retirement savings, and employers will be indifferent to
their coverage."0 In contrast, the government must be concerned about
the retirement security of every person, including those who change
jobs frequently; those who leave to work for competitors; intermittent
workers; young workers; and nonwage-earning spouses. To the extent
the government and employer interests are in conflict, the government
must seek to channel the employer's actions toward broader social pur-
poses."1 Today, there are participation rules, coverage rules, vesting
rules, and a variety of other rules and regulations, many of which Pro-
fessor Graetz describes, 2 that constrain the choices of employers in or-
der to ensure a broader distribution of pension benefits. Because em-
ployer-sponsored plans are voluntary, however, the government may, in
order to avoid plan terminations, hesitate to impose regulations that
employers find burdensome, expensive, or inconsistent with their inter-
ests. Thus, as Professor Graetz" argues, 3 the minimum vesting stan-
dards, even as modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, fail to protect
adequately the retirement security needs of workers who have intermit-
tent or unconventional career paths. The government's rules for private
pensions arguably are the consequence of the government's tempering
retirement income goals in response to objections of employers.
In light of the inescapable tension that stems from reliance on vol-
untary private pensions, it might seem logical to substitute mandatory
" The employer might actually prefer not to cover younger workers if those
workers would demand higher compensation, on an actuarial basis, if paid in deferred
form. See Altman, supra note 8, at 473 (citing Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Quali-
fied Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV.
419, 431 (1984)).
" Some regulation of private pensions would be required even if these pensions
were not seen as a part of the national retirement income system. Even if the govern-
ment saw itself only as a neutral arbiter, as it did in the beginning of the century, it
would have to resolve disputes among the plan sponsor and the beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898) (holding that a
pension is a mere gratuity, and funds set aside for its payment are the sole property of
the employer). But see Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 85 Utah 281, 39
P.2d 342 (1934) (holding that a pension constitutes a unilateral contract whose terms
are fulfilled at retirement age, and therefore, payment of the promised amount must be
made). Moreover, as part of the government's responsibility in determining the tax
consequences of pension arrangements, some regulation would be required to ensure
that the plans were bona fide.
82 See Graetz, supra note 2, at 883-88.
83 See id. at 885-87.
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private pensions or a fully adequate Social Security program." Under
these alternatives, people would look to the mandatory program or pro-
grams for support after a designated age and after they cease to work.
Voluntary private pension arrangements, together with their tax-fa-
vored treatment, would presumably cease to exist.8 5 Both of these alter-
native systems could be constructed to provide benefits that were more
equitable in their distribution and generally more adequate in their
levels than the current system."' Nevertheless, these alternatives have
serious weaknesses.
A nationally standardized retirement income system, whether in
the form of Social Security alone or Social Security in combination with
mandatory private pensions, is not flexible enough to meet the needs of
our complicated economy: The system would be unable to respond rap-
idly to changing conditions. Furthermore, such a system would proba-
bly not permit targeted responses to the circumstances of different sec-
tors of the economy. Today, employers can tailor the terms of their
pension plans to the particular needs of their employees. Under a
mandatory system, employers would be much more constrained. The
basic system would be extremely costly, and, as mentioned above,
favorable tax treatment for voluntary arrangements would probably be
repealed. As a consequence, voluntary arrangements on top of the
-mandatory system would be prohibitively expensive. Moreover, because
the mandatory system presumably would specify a benefit package, em-
ployers would most likely lack the flexibility to overcome the cost obsta-
cles by changing the mandated priorities, making certain benefit ele-
s4 Some form of group pension seems imperative if adequate retirement income is
to be achieved. Individual savings are unlikely to play more than a minor role in pro-
viding retirement income for most people. For a discussion of the reasons for the inade-
quacy of individual savings, see Altman, supra note 8, at 502 (citing Thompson, supra
note 25, at 1440).
11 The current favorable tax treatment is justified on grounds of encouraging vol-
untary plans. See PRESIDENT's TAx PROPOSALS, supra note 8, at 375. If a mandatory
system that met national retirement goals existed, the need to encourage supplemental
voluntary plans would disappear. If there were a perceived need to supplement the
mandatory program or programs, the system would be similar to the current hybrid
system, but the mix of mandatory and voluntary components would be different. For a
brief critique of that kind of change, see infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
Moreover, it is probably impossible to tax large defined-benefit pension plans in a
neutral manner, as a result of progressive tax rates and annual accounting years. See
Altman, supra note 8, at 448-49. Therefore, if the favorable tax treatment were re-
pealed, voluntary pension arrangements might be deterred by negative tax consequences
as well.
88 Professor Graetz appropriately defines the goal of national retirement income
policies as the replacement of preretirement wages at a level sufficient to maintain the
standard of living of at least low- and perhaps even moderate-income workers. See
Graetz, supra note 2, at 855-56.
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ments more generous at the expense of other elements.
For example, some private pension plans offer employees the op-
tion of retiring earlier than the earliest retirement age under Social Se-
curity.87 These plans may permit early retirees to receive larger bene-
fits between that early retirement age and the age at which they begin
to receive benefits under Social Security, and smaller benefits thereaf-
ter. In that way, the combined income from private pension benefits
and Social Security benefits would remain constant throughout retire-
ment. Under a program of mandatory pensions, employers would be
unlikely to have the option to rearrange benefit levels and retirement
ages because the government would then have difficulty ensuring that
every plan in the country did indeed provide the federally mandated
benefit. If employers either had no plans, or lacked the flexibility to so
design their mandatory plans, older employees who were not able to
maintain the demanding pace of particular jobs would be forced to turn
to unemployment compensation, disability benefits, or means-tested
welfare before satisfying the uniform, nationwide, preset retirement
age. Moreover, Some plans provide subsidized early retirement op-
tions.88 In the absence of this inducement, employers might be forced to
rely on layoffs in a contracting industry.
Further, if Social Security were expanded to replace today's pri-
vate pensions and if funding remained on a pay-as-you-go basis,8" an
important source of investment capital would be eliminated. If, instead,
Social Security were advance-funded, serious questions would arise
concerning who would control the assets and where they would be in-
vested. Moreover, regardless of the resolution of those issues, difficult
fiscal and other policy questions would arise as a result of the sheer
magnitude of the fund reserves.90 Although mandatory private pensions
would avoid some of these capital accumulation problems, they would
have other shortcomings. For example, if benefits were not coordinated
with Social Security, the combined benefits could result in overpension-
ing for some retirees and underpensioning for others. 9 If benefit for-
87 See M. MEYER, PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: 1981 EDITION 29 (1981).
88 See id. at 29-30.
89 Social Security is financed on a current-funded or pay-as-you-go basis with
only small contingency reserves. See TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 18, at 17.
90 For a discussion on a related question regarding the issues raised by a poten-
tially large build-up in the reserves of Social Security in the 1990s, see Munnell &
Blais, Do We Want Large Social Security Surpluses?, NEW. ENG. ECON. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1984, at 5.
9" This can occur because Social Security has a progressive benefit formula. Pri-
vate pension benefits that in combination with Social Security are fully adequate for
high-income workers will be higher than full replacement for low-income workers. For
a description of the Social Security benefit formula, see R. MEYERS, supra note 3, at
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mulae were integrated with Social Security, the system would be ex-
tremely complicated, imposing substantial administrative costs on even
small employers.92
Reliance on voluntary private pensions permits flexibility in re-
tirement arrangements and avoids the other shortcomings of a fully ad-
equate retirement system that relies either on Social Security alone or
on Social Security in combination with mandatory private pensions.
Nevertheless, if the retirement income system ig to rely on voluntary
plans, the current distribution of retirement income, which Professor
Graetz properly denounces, must be changed. The favorable tax treat-
ment with respect to private pensions is intended to encourage employ-
ers to provide their workers with pensions that supplement Social Se-
curity.9" If this tax expenditure is to be justified, it must induce
retirement benefits not only for the highest-income individuals,9 but
also for those low- and moderate-income workers whose wages are not
adequately replaced by Social Security and who are unable to save suf-
ficient amounts on their own.95
Notwithstanding Professor Graetz's expressed concern, his propo-
sal to impose a flat tax on pension funds does not alter the maldistribu-
tion of private pension benefits. Rather, by reducing the tax advantages
associated with private pensions, his proposal would simply make pri-
vate pensions somewhat less attractive as tax-savings devices. 6 With
49-89, 147-68; Altman, supra note 8, at 477-78. For a discussion of the current inte-
gration rules, see id. at 478-94.
92 More fundamentally, a requirement of mandatory pensions does not take into
account other pressing needs. The government arguably should mandate a package of
fringe benefits, just as it requires a minimum cash wage. The government action, how-
ever, should be comprehensive so that priorities and overall cost are carefully assessed.
93 The author has argued elsewhere that the goal of encouraging supplemental
pensions was not the original purpose behind the favorable tax treatment. See Altman,
supra note 8, at 446-50. Today, however, the purpose is clear. See PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS, supra note 8, at 375.
"' Some argue that the retirement security of the highest-income people should
only be important to the government as a method of gaining security for others. See,
e.g., Graetz, supra note 2, at 857-58. But see PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS, supra
note 8, at 375.
" Social Security provides inadequate benefits to maintain the standard of living
of all workers except those at the lowest end of the income scale. See Altman, supra
note 8, at 476-77, 494-96, 501.
" The primary tax advantage of qualified private pension plans is that the in-
come of the funds held in trust is tax exempt. See Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Tax-
ing the Time Value of Money, 95 YALE L.J. 506, 539 (1986). If the income were not
held in these trust arrangements, but instead were held by the beneficiaries, the income
would be taxed, like all other ordinary income, at each beneficiary's tax rate. To the
extent the income held in trust is taxed, the tax advantage of this arrangement dimin-
ishes. Indeed, if the tax proposed by Professor Graetz is higher than the tax that would
be imposed on the income held by lower-income employees, those employees would
actually be better off, from a tax perspective, if they simply held the funds directly
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the reduction in tax advantages, fewer plans might exist, and those that
did might provide smaller benefits. Nevertheless, those benefits presum-
ably would continue to be distributed in the very manner he criticizes.
Dedicating the revenue his proposal raises to increasing the benefits
provided to low- and moderate-income workers under Social Security
would improve the equity of the entire retirement income system. Such
a dedicated tax, however, could inadvertently undermine the security of
Social Security. The payroll tax used to finance Social Security9" pro-
vides complete correspondence between those who pay the program's
costs and those who receive the benefits. This complete correspondence,
which presumably provides participants with a strong sense of entitle-
ment, would be missing under Professor Graetz's tax.9 The introduc-
tion of this new, extraneous source of revenue, which lacks the com-
plete correspondence of the payroll tax, could weaken the earned-right
quality of Social Security, that is so important to the program's
support.
Voluntary private pensions should be retained as an important
part of the national system of providing retirement income. The distri-
bution of voluntary plan benefits, however, should be made more equi-
table.99 The threat of plan terminations is no real threat if the equity of
these arrangements is not increased. The trend of legislative changes
has been in the direction of provisions designed to result in more bene-
fits for low- and moderate-income workers.' 0 The opportunity for fur-
ther reform exists. As a result of the large federal deficit and the size of
rather than indirectly through the pension trust.
" In addition to the payroll tax, small amounts of general revenue are used to
finance Social Security. See supra note 28; infra note 98.
98 If Professor Graetz's tax were imposed on public pension plans, it would be
imposed indirectly on some workers not covered under Social Security. The workers not
covered under Social Security include federal civilian employees hired before January
1, 1984, and state and local employees working for employers who have opted not to
participate in Social Security. See 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987). Moreover, not all participants in Social Security would be subject to Pro-
fessor Graetz's tax. It should be noted that this lack of correspondence currently exists
with respect to the revenue derived from the taxation of Social Security benefits, which
are cycled back into the program. It is for that reason that some critics opposed the
cycling back of revenues. See R. MYERS, supra note 3 at 447-79.
" For a set of proposals that seek to achieve a more equitable distribution, see
Altman, supra note 8, at 470-75, 494-500 (proposing modifications in the coverage,
integration, and vesting rules).
100 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1111-15, 100 Stat.
2085, 2435-54 (modifying the coverage, integration, vesting, and other rules concerned
with equity); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 &
West Supp. 1987)) (adopting minimum standards for vesting and participation as well
as other rules designed to increase the equitable distribution of private pension plan
benefits).
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the tax expenditure associated with private pensions, Congress will
probably continue to modify the private pension plan rules in its deficit
and revenue packages. Although the revenue generated by distribu-
tional reforms is negligible,"'1 the Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggests
that these kinds of reforms can be successfully included in legislation
that has revenue (or in that case, revenue neutrality) as a principal
concern.
In addition to criticizing the distribution of the retirement benefits
of private plans, Professor Graetz is critical of the concomitant skewing
of the tax savings. Some of the maldistribution would be corrected if the
underlying retirement benefits were distributed more fairly. Neverthe-
less, even with a perfectly proportionate distribution of pension benefits
to all those who fail to receive adequate benefits from Social Security,
the tax advantages would still disproportionately favor high-income
taxpayers. This result is to be expected from a progressive income tax
system that makes use of tax expenditures to achieve public purposes.
High-income workers who have higher income tax liabilities benefit
disproportionately from exemptions, deferrals, and deductions.
The granting of tax benefits to higher-income taxpayers is a neces-
sary byproduct of reliance on voluntary pensions. In order to retain
voluntary employer-provided pensions as a significant part of the
American retirement income system, favorable tax treatment must be
preserved.10 2 While private employers have a variety of nontax reasons
to provide retirement income for their employees, federal regulation of
these arrangements undermines some of the nontax incentives and in-
creases the cost. Employers cannot escape most other federal labor reg-
ulations, like minimum wage and maximum hour rules. In contrast,
employers can discard deferred compensation. As a consequence, some
incentive is necessary to make the labor regulation of voluntary pen-
sions effective. As in the case of the payroll tax, the regressivity of the
tax expenditure for private pensions should not cause the existing tax
treatment to be altered. Rather, policymakers should ensure that, when
viewed comprehensively, the federal tax burden retains a progressive
tilt, notwithstanding the preferential tax treatment of voluntary private
pensions.
1o REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. table 111-2 (1986).
102 Because of the difficulties involved in treating deferred compensation neutrally,
removing the favorable tax treatment might actually result in penalizing that form of
compensation. See Altman, supra note 8, at 448-50.
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CONCLUSION
Part I of this Response argued that the various programs and poli-
cies that comprise the retirement income system should be viewed com-
prehensively. When so analyzed, they demonstrate an overarching logic,
despite the incremental and fragmented way in which the system has
developed. Social Security ensures that all workers will receive a mini-
mal level of retirement income at the ends of their working lives. Social
Security, however, is inadequate by itself to provide complete retire-
ment income for most workers. Decentralized, but highly regulated,
voluntary private pensions, encouraged by tax subsidies, supplement
Social Security. This hybrid pension system affords basic protection for
workers while providing the important flexibility necessary in a com-
plex economy.
Significant incremental reforms are necessary to make the system
fairer, more adequate, and more secure. Dramatic overhauls or shifts in
direction, however, are unwarranted and unwise. Modifications of the
Social Security component should be made within the fundamental
framework that was established at the program's inception and has
served to keep the program politically popular and secure. This frame-
work rests on the notion of an earned right. Reforms of the type sug-
gested by Professor Graetz, while designed to improve the program,
threaten to undermine its basic foundation. Better methods are availa-
ble to address his tax equity concerns.
The voluntary private pension component of the system is in
greater need of improvement. As Professor Graetz points out, the pri-
vate pension component falls far short of the equity, adequacy, and se-
curity essential to a national retirement income system 03 Here too,
though, the reforms should be in the direction of improving private
pensions, not in the direction of undermining them, as Professor Graetz
proposes.
Professor Graetz praises the pension changes contained in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.04 Congress should continue along the same lines
to strengthen the requirements imposed on voluntary private pensions.
The nation will then discover whether the retirement income system
can become adequate and equitable for all workers and yet remain suf-
ficiently flexibile to accommodate the needs of a complex economy.
1o See Graetz, supra note 2, at 874-94.
I04 See id. at 901-902.
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